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COMBATING CORRUPTION:  
LESSONS OUT OF INDIA 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the ubiquitous problem of corruption among public officials– 
both elected and appointed, in India. By looking at the legal and administrative 
provisions to combat corruption, it is shown how futile the attempts so far have been. 
Among the plethora of reasons for failure to combat corruption, it is concluded that the 
more important ones are the inadequate and inefficient enforcement mechanisms, lack 
of political will, and more importantly the cultural context of social tolerance and easy 
forgiveness. Any outrage that is there is largely confined to rhetoric, not action. 
Despite some helpful developments such as the newly conferred freedom of 
information, active investigative media and engaged civic groups, reasons for optimism 
appear to be minimal. The need seems to be a serious effort to develop sound norms by 
changing the societal culture, which places the premium on the shoulders of political 
parties. 
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 “One cannot mandate honesty.”  
 Veerappa Moily, Chair,   
  Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2007 
           
       
India did not invent corruption, but it seems to excel in it. Preoccupation with the 
subject is almost ancient. While categorizing “forty ways of embezzlement” and as to 
how to deal with that, Kautilya made the following observation about human behavior:   
 
“Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison 
that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for 
a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the 
king’s revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot 
possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking 
water, so government servants employed in the government 
work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for 
themselves).” 
 
In its “India Corruption Study 2005", Transparency International (TI) found as many as 
62% of Indians believed corruption is real and in fact had first hand experience of 
paying bribes. Three-fourths in the survey also believed that the level of corruption in 
public services has only increased during 2004-2005. It is estimated that a total of about 
$5 billion are paid annually as bribes. The police are ranked as the most corrupt, 
followed by lower judiciary and Land Administration.1  In its September 2007 study, 
Corruption Perception Index, TI again placed India 72nd (tying with China and Brazil) 
with its neighbors Sri Lanka at 94th, Pakistan 138th and Bangladesh 162nd as among the 
most corrupt of the 180 nations that it surveyed.3 Yet,  Suresh Pachauri, Minister of 
State for Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, declared: “Government is fully 
committed to implement its policy of zero tolerance against corruption. It is moving 
progressively to eradicate corruption by improving transparency and accountability.”4 
This is a rather sorry state for a country which is held up often as a proud example of a 
stable and fast progressing polity among the less developed countries (LDCs), and the 
most populous working democracy in the world.  
Corruption conventionally is viewed as a transactional evil where money changes hands 
either in anticipation of favors, or favors already conferred. However,  the more serious 




International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 




with, and/or substituted for, national interests and the general welfare of the populace 
has been studied elsewhere.5 The following pages are thus devoted to the study of the 
reasons for, and consequences of, corruption in its conventional sense, and the efficacy 
of measures taken in India to combat it.6 Studying the subject within the ecological 
perspective in the tradition of John M. Gaus and Fred Riggs,7 this paper is divided into 
the following sections. The first provides a brief introduction. The second explains the 
Indian context. The third and fourth examine administrative and political corruption, 
respectively. While the fifth discusses the available legal provisions and institutional 
arrangements, the sixth explicates the application of those measures. The final section 
draws some conclusions, followed by some suggestions.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
We start with the premise that corruption is antithetical to good governance any where. 
However, "the folklore of corruption" 8 must be approached with great caution as the 
very concept of corruption is fraught with many a pitfall. A simple and useful definition 
is given by Carl J. Friedrich. For him, corruption "is a kind of behavior which deviates 
from the norm actually prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context...  It is 
deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at 
public expense.... Such private gain may be monetary one, and in the minds of the 
general public it usually is, but it may take other forms."9 Several caveats, however,  
must be noted.  
First, lacking a precise and universally accepted definition, often all and sundry actions, 
including inefficiency in performance, are considered as being corrupt in addition to its 
transactional facets. Second, the debate needs to be tempered by certain culture-specific 
imperatives. For example, in the Hindu culture, as is normal in other parts of the orient, 
while visiting an elder or a superior, one is expected to carry a gift, however small or 
inconsequential it is, as a mark of respect and not as an instrument of corruption 
(although it might serve that purpose too). Third, a distinction must be made between 
the magnitude (size of bribe), and frequency (its pervasiveness). Fourth, there is the 
issue of cause and effect in that who is to be blamed for the initiative– the client who 
offers the bribe or the official who demands/receives it?10. Fifth, there is often the 
confusion stemming from the failure to analytically distinguish between the conduct of 
elected public officials and that of the civil servants as the behavior of each group, after 
all, follows different imperatives– the former for electoral and personal reasons 
perhaps, and the latter because of need or greed. Sixth,  there is a certain duality in less 
developed countries (LDCs) where personal life is judged by indigenous cultural 
standards while the official conduct is largely assessed under western norms. Seventh, 
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to the nature of societal development process with individual behavior trying to catch 
up. In fact, corruption here is thought to be the grease that facilitates at least some 
things get done which otherwise would not11.  
There, however, is a shared belief that corruption is dysfunctional as it deviates from 
established norms. Hence it is illegal. It is inequitable as only those with resources can 
get things done, and those in crucial seats of power become rich due to unearned, or 
unduly earned, income. It is wasteful in an economic sense because resources are spent 
on an activity that did not deserve any further expenditure, to start with. It also leads to 
a lot of misery for the client who is often taken hostage. And of course, it is contrary to 
the tenets of good governance.  
 
THE CONTEXT OF CORRUPTION 
Before dwelling on pervasive corruption and the efficacy (or lack thereof) of several 
efforts  to combat it, one must put the Indian scene in perspective. It is argued here that 
(i) the very diversity and the prevailing contradictions result in a certain normlessness, 
and (ii) the politico-economic system provides various power points and opportunities 
that allow corruption to flourish. The above are studied under three headings: 
demographic, economic and cultural.  
 (a) Demographics: India has an estimated population of 1.07 billion in 2004, 
speaking eighteen languages (besides English) and as many as 1,652 dialects. There are 
several religions with a predominant Hindu majority (81.3%) and the largest Muslim 
minority (12%). The average life span of 27 years at the time of independence in 1947, 
is now at 63.9 years. With an estimated GDP (Purchasing Power Parity– PPP) of 
US$3.2 trillion and a 7.6 percent average annual growth rate, its per capita income was 
estimated by the World Bank at $780 in 2006. Nearly a fourth of India’s population 
lives below poverty line. With 66 percent of its population living in rural areas, India 
has only 54 percent of its land arable, and agriculture still contributes 24 percent of its 
GDP.12 In June 2008 inflation rate stood at 11.05%–  a thirteen year high, as against the 
Reserve Bank target of 5.5%.  
It is also a land of stark contradictions. It is the most populous working democracy, 
with 29 States (including Delhi, which has semi-statehood) and 6 Union Territories. 
Yet, no constitutional status was provided for local self-government until the passage of 
the 73rd and 74th Amendments in 1992. To accommodate the great diversity, it opted for 
a federal form of government, but fearing fissiparous tendencies called it as the “Union 
of India.”    
As the fifth largest economy in the world (by some counts fourth, certainly third in 
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has nearly two-thirds of its population living off agriculture, forestry and fisheries.  
With only 52 percent of its population literate, (State of Kerala in south boasts 90 
percent while Rajasthan in north languishes at about 40 percent) the nation with 219 
institutions of higher learning at the University level produces the second largest 
number of scientists and engineers in the world.   
It had a woman Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, who was considered to be one of the 
most powerful democratic leaders in the world, and was voted as the “Woman of the 
Century” in a poll conducted by BBC.13 But successive governments, as of today, have 
had trouble in getting a law passed to reserve 33 percent of all legislative seats for 
women (local bodies already have this quota). Although the nation has been struggling 
with the inequities of the caste system, it however, decided in 1990 to extend minority 
preference in public service to other backward classes (OBCs) whose definition was 
based predominantly on caste (further to the Mandal Commission recommendation in 
1980).14  
Ever since its 1974 explosion of a nuclear device and the 1998 tests of five nuclear 
bombs and several missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, India entered the 
select nuclear club. It, however, is not a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. It fought three bloody wars with Pakistan, and was beaten by China in 1962. 
According to Washington-based World Watch, as far back as twenty years ago it led 
the Third World among arms producers (followed by Israel).15 But it professes to be the 
leader of non-aligned and peaceful nations.  
While the country leap-frogged into the electronic age beginning in 1990, used 
electronic voting machines in its 2004 general lections and is now an Information 
Technology (IT) powerhouse, large part of India, rural as it is, still languishes in the age 
of the bullock-cart with little amenities. What with the low water tables, climate 
change, and the spurt in the growth of population, the last two years, India had to 
import wheat. Millions go hungry on a daily basis due to poor food distribution, or 
where available cannot afford to buy food due to lack of income. 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which led the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
coalition government (defeated in the 2004 general elections) came into prominence 
after some of its followers destroyed the Babri mosque in 1992 which was allegedly 
built upon a Hindu temple.16 But once in power, it showed a good measure of 
secularism in a way when its appointments to the position of State Governors included 
a lower caste Christian, a Syrian Christian, a Protestant, a Muslim, and people of other 
religions.17 Contrarily, it not only exonerated, but also supported another of its party 
leaders – Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi – who has been much criticized for 
his inability to prevent, and even accused by some of fomenting, large scale religious 
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as enshrined in the Constitution of India, most every party continues to use religion for 
electoral advantage. 
 (b) Economics: On the political economy front, under the helmsmanship of its 
first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the country started with the credo of 
“democratic socialism.” Unleashing massive social engineering, it resulted in one of the 
most administered states by capturing the “commanding heights” of the national 
economy.   By 1990 however, it turned towards economic liberalization under its New 
Economic Policy (NEP). A traditionally hoarding culture has since changed into a fully 
consumer-oriented one worshiping wealth, no matter how it is accumulated. While 
under the previous economic regime it was the administrator who was considered to be 
corrupt, now the politicians have not only taken over the lead but also been co-opting 
the administrators. 
 (c) Culture: Despite the fact it is well modernized and westernized, India clings 
to a lot of its tradition, and more so to occult. It is important to take note here of the 
cultural dimension of the majority Indian population– the Hindus. Hinduism is not a 
proselytizing religion but largely a way of life. Not only other religions such as 
Buddhism and Sikhism emanated from it, it has also been largely tolerant and 
absorbing, at least till recently. Yet, when the country was partitioned on the eve of 
independence in 1947, religious fanaticism rose to such a level that it resulted in the 
largest migration of over 17 million people across borders in both directions between a 
predominantly Hindu India and the Islamic theocracy, Pakistan. And in 1971, as 
Pakistan was dismembered with the creation of a new nation, Bangladesh (out of 
former East Pakistan), as many as 10 million Bengali refugees poured into India, and to 
this day the eastern Indian States continue to agitate against these “foreigners.”  
Hinduism in general is also personally forgiving in nature. An errant individual can 
always go to a superior (a religious leader, or simply one who is senior in age) and fall 
on his/her feet, literally and unashamedly, and the chances are that leniency will be 
shown almost immediately regardless of the fact the culprit may or may not have 
repented at all. Nirad C. Chaudhuri captured its essence thus: "The unlimited capacity 
to be a villain of the worst kind with an unlimited capacity for self-abasement before 
virtue and nobility is one of the most disarming traits of the Indian character...."18 Life 
at two different, and often contradictory, levels of existence for the Indian is not 
abnormal. Even the most debased material living can co-exist with a high abstraction of 
life. Deviance in personal and material life is accepted and forgiven when the search is 
for a purportedly higher truth. The present and the observed, for the Hindu, is only 
maya– illusion.  Thus, two apparently contradictory, but not necessarily conflicting 
behavior patterns are manifest, and are tolerated.  
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Neither is this a modern day development; nor is it far different from the experience of 
other nations. The British colonial administration contributed generously to this 
scourge. To quote Cornwall Lewis, a member of the British House of Commons: "...no 
civilized Government existed on this earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious 
and more rapacious than the Government of the East India Company from 1765-
1784."19 At least one Governor-General of India, Warren Hastings, was impeached (but 
exonerated) in Britain for all his misdeeds in India. Modern day India is no exception. 
For instance, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) recognized as many as 33 
different modes of corruption.20  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION 
India’s high ranking among the corrupt is already shown above. For analytical 
purposes, there are two types of corruption by public officials– the administrators 
(appointed civil servants), and the elected politicians.  
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It has been argued over and over that the established economic order, accorded ample 
opportunities towards administrative corruption. The earlier commitment to democratic 
socialism led to a great deal of state intervention through licensing of many an aspect of 
private entrepreneurship (and consequently to a bureaucratic stranglehold on private 
lives) resulting in the label of a “permit Raj."  
The Santhanam Committee confirmed thus as far back as in 1964: "The sudden 
extension of the economic activities of the Government with a large armory of 
regulations, controls, licenses and permits provided new and large opportunities (for 
corruption)."21 Planned development, observed Kuldeep Mathur, "considerably helped 
the bureaucrats to acquire administrative and political power, which expanded their role 
in the economy, permitting them greater opportunity to satisfy their self-interest."22   
Robert Wade summed up the situation the best, thus: "Several structural features of 
Indian society predispose the administrative and political system to a high level of 
corruption: acute scarcities; a large regulatory and allocative role of the state; a pre-
eminent bureaucracy, faced with declining real salaries; a rapidly expanding middle 
class demanding access to the state."23  N. Vittal, former Central Vigilance 
Commissioner (CVC), wrote:   
 
“Nearly half of those who avail services of most often visited public 
departments of Government in the country had the first hand experience 
of giving bribe at one time or the other. In fact, as high as two thirds of 
people think that corruption in these offices is real. However, one third 
think corruption is more exaggerated. And yet, 80 per cent of people are 
passive and hardly 20 per cent had ever complained about such 
corruption to any. It is interesting that while 50 per cent of the people 
reported that they had bribed, only 20 per cent took the trouble of 
complaining. This also highlights the need for sensitizing the public 
about the dangers of corruption.”24 
 
NEP since 1990, with its liberalization, inaugurated a neo-capitalist culture and whipped 
up a voracious appetite for accumulation of wealth. It has also transformed a largely 
traditional and hoarding society into a consumer nation with great abandon and 
amorality. In other words, the opportunity for corruption became abundant starting with 
a highly administered society to the current neo-liberal economy.  
 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
While a great deal has been said of administrative corruption, little attention was paid 
till recently towards the behavior of elected public officials and those aspiring for 
elected offices. The decline of the Congress party along with the disappearance of “tall” 
leaders who kept national interests ahead of everything else saw the growth of regional 
parties and “pulp culture” where regional and personal interests tended to stand above 
all else.25  Public office is often seen as a good source for private gain. Political parties 
also have successfully helped criminalize politics and politicize crime. For example, in 
2002 for the 403 seats in the State of Uttar Pradesh (UP) legislative Assembly there 
were 910 candidates from all parties contesting, 430 of whom were accused of assorted 
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crimes ranging from murder, rape, kidnaping for ransom, and dacoity. A Dhanajay 
Singh won the election despite the fact he was a “contract killer” with 43 different 
criminal cases pending against him including being the prime suspect in the murder of 
the State’s Medical Health Director, Dr. Bacchiter Singh.26 Of those elected, 190 have 
had criminal records leading to a caustic comment that they might as well form the 
government by themselves, as they had a near majority.27 
In recent memory, former Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and P. V. Narasimha Rao, 
besides other Cabinet Ministers, were accused of large scale corruption (both 
exonerated later.) Even the former Speaker of Lok Sabha (the lower House of 
Parliament), Balram Jhakar, faced major corruption charges. There were at one time as 
many as 46 different corruption cases pending before three special courts against the 
then Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu, Jayalalitha Jayaraman. Bihar Chief 
Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav was forced to resign his office pending major corruption 
inquiries into what is known as the fodder scam which is yet to be resolved in 2008. 
(Paradoxically, he is now elevated to the national stage having been elected to the Lok 
Sabha, and rewarded with the Railway Ministry in the central Cabinet. Rumor was that 
he demanded, rather unsuccessfully the Home Ministry which would have given him 
some control over the investigations.) The list goes on and on resulting in the general 
cynical belief that all politicians by nature are corrupt, and that they seek public office 
to enrich themselves. Ironically, almost all the accused continue to be active political 
participants with impunity. News papers are replete with all sorts of stories of raids of 
houses of politicians, civil servants and businessmen. But very few spend time in jails; 
and if and when they did go to jail on rare occasions, there is no stigma attached, and 
soon are rehabilitated as they come out of jail. 
Such state of affairs provoked the Election Commission (EC) to remark that 
lawbreakers have become lawmakers. It is argued that the electorate cannot make an 
informed judgement on the candidates running for office unless all the antecedents of 
each candidate are made public. To this end, the Association for Democratic Reform, 
comprising of several civic groups, went to court demanding the disclosure of the 
background of all candidates, as was recommended by the Law Commission in its 170th 
Report.28 The Vohra Committee in 1993 also thought the same. On November 2, 2000, 
the Delhi High Court obliged and directed the EC to issue directives accordingly. But 
the BJP led NDA government appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that under 
Article 84 of the Constitution, the power to decide on the qualifications of candidates 
belonged to the Parliament, and the EC cannot step into this arena, even when there is 
no adequate legislation.29   
The Supreme Court in its May 2, 2002 decision, however, upheld the right of the voters 
to know the details on the candidates, and ruled that where legislation is silent the EC 
can indeed step in with directions. Consequently, asserting the importance of 
transparency in a democracy, the EC gave the necessary directions to the effect that all 
candidates running for a legislature (be at the States level or to the Parliament) should 
file an affidavit before the EC with full details of their past record on five counts: any 
conviction, acquittal or discharge of any criminal offence in the last six months prior to 
filing their nomination papers; any accusations in pending cases punishable with 
imprisonment of two or more years; assets (both movable and immovable) of self and 
those of spouses and dependents as well; any liabilities, particularly any dues payable to 
public financial institutions or Government; and the educational qualifications of one 
self.  
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But the Government of India, joined by 21 other political parties, thought otherwise and 
came up with a watered-down Ordinance (as the Parliament was not in session) on 
August 24, 2002, amending the Representation of the People Act of 1951, and sent it for 
the signature of the President. After a lot politicking and posturing by the government 
and other parties, the Ordinance was signed by the President into law. However, given 
the variance between the EC’s directives and the new law, the Supreme Court was again 
moved by the National Campaign for Electoral Reforms (NCER) and others. The Court 
gave its decision on March 13, 2003, basically reiterating the previous 2002 decision 
which required full disclosure by candidates. Not only that, if a rival candidate were to 
file an affidavit with information contrary to what a candidate disclosed, such 
information must also be disseminated under this ruling of the Court.  
In the new general elections in March-April 2004, it is said that 25 to 30 members of 
Parliament and 250 to 300 members of state Assemblies have had criminal histories. 
“The line between criminality and politics,” observed a staunch advocate of political 
and electoral reforms, “is being erased in many parts of India...With coalition politics, 
the numbers speak. You are no longer able to make clean choices.”30  
Mention must be made of at least two Ministers in the current Cabinet of the Congress 
Party led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who heads the UPA coalition of 19 
different parties. Against one there are criminal charge sheets in a fodder scam that 
deprived him of the Chief Ministership of the State of Bihar (Laloo Prasad Yadav, 
holding the Railway Portfolio, as already seen). Another (Taslimuddin, who holds the 
Agriculture, Food and Civil Supplies portfolio), also from Bihar, has a criminal 
background.31 The opposition, led by the BJP made an issue of these “tainted Ministers” 
and had successfully stalled the parliamentary proceedings for a while. They even 
prevented the customary, polite “motion of thanks” following the President’s inaugural 
speech to the new Parliament, forgetting that they had after all accommodated their own 
Defense Minister, George Fernandez, who initially resigned consequent to the Tehelka 
revelations, but returned to his office in no time (before the case is adjudged; see 
below). 
Considering this general degradation, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission 
(henceforward ARC-2) observed in 2007 thus: “In our case, at times public office is 
perceived to be an extension of one’s property. That is why, sometimes, public offices 
are a source of huge corruption and a means of extending patronage.”32 Such patronage 
has been in a way institutionalized with the inauguration of the Members of Parliament 
Local Area Development Schemes (MPLADs), whereby each member of Parliament 
(MP) is entitled to spend about Rs. 20 million each year to purportedly develop 
individual constituencies.33 
Government agency demands for kickbacks for the party (parties) in power from even 
foreign firms are also known.34 And the general populace has taken all this as a matter of 
course; it became second nature. Any client can attest to the fact that petty bribery is 
pretty common. The current high-stakes corruption is in the form of land-grab in the 
name of establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) or other purported economic 
development schemes. All this leads to the single naughty question: Aren’t there laws 
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LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 
The short answer to the above question is not that there is any dearth of legal and 
administrative measures to deal with errant public officials; there indeed are several.35 
Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 established the initial legal source 
meant to deal with bribe-taking and favoritism. While no precise definition of the word 
“corruption” was provided, this Section gave the most comprehensive explanation of a 
corrupt person as one 
  
“...being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts, or obtains, or 
agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or 
for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal 
remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any 
official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his 
official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or 
attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the 
Central or any State or with any public servant as such...”
36 
 
This was followed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 which defined a new 
offense– “Criminal Misconduct in discharge of official duty” punishable by 1-7 years 
imprisonment. To protect innocent civil servants from harassment, it is also stipulated 
that no authority less than the one which appointed an officer could remove or punish 
otherwise. The sanctioning authority may be called in at the time of prosecution to 
adduce evidence on the sanction. Also, the complainant/bribe-giver is protected from 
prosecution as without such immunity no one might come forward to complain. 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 made some changes such as making abetting of 
offences an offence. All corruption related cases shall be tried only by special judges. 
The First Five Year Plan in 1952 emphasized integrity in public life, and thought that  
corruption "not only inflicts wrongs which are difficult to redress, but undermines the 
structure of administration and the confidence of the public in administration.  There 
must, therefore, be a continuous war against every species of corruption within the 
administration as well as in public life..."37 In 1955, an Administrative Vigilance 
Commission was created within the Ministry of Home Affairs (later located within the 
Department of Personnel & Training) with the responsibility to provide direction and 
coordinate the various efforts of the Ministries to deal with corruption.   
Perhaps the most important development in this context was the 1964 Report of the 
Committee on Prevention of Corruption, otherwise known as the Santhanam 
Committee, mentioned above. This Committee, following the logic that an executive 
body impartially inquiring into its own conduct is more or less an anomaly, 
recommended the creation of a Commission, headed by a Commissioner independent of 
the executive part of government, i.e., all Ministries. The government accepted it, and 
set up the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) in the same year. Each Ministry also 
came to have a Vigilance Officer, whose appointment will be subject to the veto of the 
CVC Commissioner.  The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 was also amended to 
make it a criminal offense to possess wealth disproportionate (which cannot be 
satisfactorily explained) to the income of a public servant.   
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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 consolidated the IPC along with all the 
Amendments. A new concept of “public duty’ was added, and penalties were enhanced. 
It also sought expeditious trials, and stipulated that no court shall stay the proceedings 
on the grounds of any error or irregularity in the sanction granted unless in the opinion 
of the court it has led to failure of justice. The Act listed (a) offences of bribery and 
other related offences and penalties; (b) abuse of authority by favoring or harming 
someone, without any pecuniary consideration or gratification; (c) obstruction or 
perversion of justice by unduly influencing law enforcement; and (d) squandering 
public money. 
In addition to the above, there are several Service Conduct Rules specifying the "dos" 
and "don'ts" for the civil servants. Article 102 of the Indian Constitution provides for 
the disqualification of any member of Parliament (a) for holding an office of profit; (b) 
declared of unsound mind by a competent court; ( c) being an undischarged insolvent; 
and (d) for voluntarily acquiring a foreign citizenship and acknowledging foreign 
allegiance. (Article 191 deals similarly with State legislators.) There indeed have been 
occasions when a parliament member was expelled for holding a position of profit. 
(Yet, an Act of 1959 exempted several positions from this definition without any rule or 
rhyme– rather arbitrarily.)  
Article 311 of the Constitution reiterated the former Prevention of Corruption Act 
provision that no civil servant can be prosecuted and punished by an authority 
subordinate to the one which made the original appointment. Further guarantees are 
provided for civil servants such as the right to be heard when charged of corruption 
during the investigation (but not when penalties are being imposed). Noteworthy is the 
provision which makes the appointing authority to make the final determination whether 
an inquiry is warranted at all (by giving its reasons in writing).  Further, the President of 
India or the Governor of a State may prevent an inquiry in the name of national security. 
While this provision was originally intended to protect the civil servants from 
harassment, it in fact turned out to be a hindrance in that sometimes no consent was 
given by the appointing authority, or if given, it came too late and/or only grudgingly. 
Veerappa Moily, Chair, ARC-2, quoting the 2004 report of the Central Vigilance 
Commission showed that “out of the 153 cases for sanction, 21 cases were pending for 
more than 3 years, 26 cases between 2-3 years, 25 between 1-2 years. The departmental 
enquiries are soft-pedalled (sic) either out of patronage or misplaced compassion.”38  
Besides the Administrative Vigilance Division, there are three other institutions at the 
Union (federal) level: (i) the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC); (ii) individual 
vigilance units in each of the Ministries and Departments of the Government of India, 
central public enterprises and other autonomous organizations; and (iii) the Central 
Bureau of Investigations (CBI). The CVC advises the Government of India on all 
matters pertaining to the maintenance of integrity in administration, and supervises the 
CBI and other vigilance administration agencies. The CBI is the principal investigative 
agency of the  central government in all anti-corruption matters. The arrangements vary 
from State to State, which have either Vigilance Commissions (eg. Tamil Nadu, West 
Bengal) or the Lokayuktas (or both such as the case in Andhra Pradesh). ARC-2 
concluded that their working leaves much to be desired relative to the central apparatus. 
It also noted that while the number of cases of corruption keeps increasing, the number 
of cases disposed off remains relatively low.  For example in 2005, of the 4,130 cases 
pending for trial at the centre only 265 were disposed of. At States level a total of 
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12,285 cases were pending in the same year, and only 2005 were disposed of. It is 
estimated that it would take about six years to clear the backlog in the States alone.39 
When a public servant is accused of corruption, the CVC may undertake an 
investigation on its own, or entrust it to the CBI or the concerned Ministry or 
Department itself. The resulting investigatory reports must be submitted to the CVC 
which would recommend to the Ministry proper action such as criminal prosecution. In 
case such a recommendation was not accepted by the Ministry, it should be noted in the 
report (of the CVC) to be placed before Parliament.  
In addition to the above, the first Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in 1969  
recommended the establishment of a Lok Pal (an Ombudsman) to oversee the conduct 
of Ministers and the Members of Parliament. But so far nothing happened although 
whether the Prime Minister’s conduct should be subjected to the authority of a Lok Pal 
continues to be a matter of hot debate.  
Besides the above governmental institutions, it is important to discuss the nascent 
investigative role of (A) the media and (B) other civic groups.   
 (A) The Media: India has always taken pride in a free press. Of late, the 
electronic medium has joined, what with the proliferation of private television channels 
and the dot.com entrepreneurs, to make up a new tool to curb corruption, or at least 
expose it. To illustrate the power of investigative journalism, a few egregious cases may 
be cited: (i) the Tehelka expose; (ii) the Petrol Pump scam; and (iii) the Aaj Tak 
episode.  
 (i) The Tehelka expose: Tarun Jit Tejpal launched a web site – Tehelka.com.40 
Investing a mere Rs. 210,000 (about US$5,000 at current rate of exchange), he started a 
sting operation with a bogus company called West End International to sell an equally 
preposterous thermal camera to the Ministry of Defense. Trying to negotiate a deal, he 
ran 270 minutes of video tape which caught no less than the then President of the BJP, 
Bangaru Laxman, taking a bribe of a paltry sum of Rs.100,000 (about US$2,300). It 
also showed the President of Samata Party, Jaya Jaitley, inviting the peddlers to the 
home of the then Defense Minister and the NDA Convener, George Fernandez, and 
receiving money supposedly for the party. (Jaitley’s name was later struck out of the list 
of bribe-takers.) Several high-ranking military brass were also caught with their pants 
down, so to speak, asking for whiskey and women. The scandal reached to the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO) as well with at least two turning up in the taped discussions –   
Brajesh Mishra and N. K. Singh, both close to Prime Minister A. B. Vajapayee. 
As some juicy segments of the tape were shown on a private television channel in 
March 2001, the BJP led government was rocked. Laxman resigned in disgrace. 
Fernandez also resigned saying that he would keep out of the government till the 
investigations into the allegation are completed. However, not too long after, he 
returned to head the Defense Ministry as talk turned to a war– a possible nuclear one– 
between India and Pakistan. “Government Shamed & Crippled,” called one prominent 
front-page.41 Paradoxically, leaving aside the substance of the accusation, the messenger 
himself came to be investigated having been charged that he was financed by unsavory 
characters, in foreign countries to boot, to undermine the BJP and its NDA government. 
The government also claimed that the tapes were a fake. Nothing of any consequence 
occurred so far.42  
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 (ii) The Petrol Pump Scam:43 On July 21, 2002, the widely read English daily, 
The Indian Express, broke a story that Ram Naik, Petroleum Minister in the NDA 
government, changed the procedures to license dealers to sell petrol, kerosene and 
cooking gas. The Chairpersons of the 59 three-member individual Dealer Selection 
Committees across the country were given virtual control over this process. It was also 
required that all applications be submitted through the state BJP chief’s office. The net 
result, as reported, was that nearly one half of the 3,850 licenses went to NDA partners 
and relatives of BJP colleagues. Thus, this turned out to be a large exercise in political 
patronage. Not surprisingly, the opposition parties in Parliament jumped on the BJP 
which has claimed all along a higher moral ground, and asked for nothing less than the 
dismissal of the Petroleum Minister.  
Prime Minister Vajpayee, stung as he was, canceled 3,565 licenses despite the fact that 
as many as 2,131 of them have already been in operation. He went on an offensive and 
pointed out that the previous Congress (I) government behaved no better in that their 
own Minister, Satish Sharma, was forced to resign for a similar patronage exercise in 
1995 following severe strictures passed by the Supreme Court. It was also claimed that 
in the present allotment process some of the leaders of the Congress (I) have in fact 
made recommendations in favor of their own candidates or clients, thus proving no one 
is above board. 
 (iii) Perhaps a more telling and successful episode occurred on December 12, 
2005, as a TV channel in its “Aaj Tak” program revealed that 11 members of Parliament 
belonging to various parties accepted money to raise questions in the Parliament 
regarding a fictitious company (North Indian Small Manufacturers Association–  
(NISMA). Based on the recommendation of a Parliamentary Committee,  all were 
expelled on the 23rd, post-haste.  
 (B) The rise of civic groups: Many a civic group came up with participation by 
several high-profile concerned and committed individuals, including former Judges, 
higher civil servants and top brass of the army. For example, the Foundation for 
Democratic Reform, with its sotto voce, Lok Satta, is a “a non-partisan people’s 
movement for reforms in the governance structure” in the country with the lofty goal 
that it is not interested in a “mere change of players, but change in the rules of the 
game” as such. (This organization is now a political party hoping to work from inside.) 
Several of these organizations have been on a literal crusade, some quite successfully, to 
empower the EC to make it mandatory that all candidates for elections must disclose 
their past life, so to speak (as seen below).44 
Several individuals also have taken recourse to what is known as Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL) to serve as watchdogs and move the courts on any suspected corrupt 
practice. While some well-meaning persons have rendered yeoman service using the 
PIL, it must be noted that on and off this tool tended to be misused on trivial grounds, or 
because of simple vendetta, thus downgrading its importance and contributing to its 
nuisance value. Some in the media also face charges of “manufacturing” news.  
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EFFICACY OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES 
While the opportunities for corruption abound, the application of anti-corruption 
measures apparently leave much to be desired, as evidenced above. As is the case with 
any criminal offense, there are two phases in dealing with corruption of public officials– 
investigation of the crime and the subsequent prosecution. The institutions which are 
established to do the first in India came under severe criticism in that they had not done 
a proper job, or did not do the job at all in certain cases depending upon who the 
accused was. When indeed someone of substance is charged, (s)he almost always 
instantaneously and invariably claims some medical emergency or disability, real or 
feigned, just to stall the proceedings. While the court system itself has proved to be 
agonizingly slow, even not to present a case before a court as investigations are not 
completed is a near travesty of justice. The 1977 Vineet Narain case (otherwise known 
as the “hawala” case, involving violation of foreign exchange rules) grabbed national 
attention showing the total failure of anti-corruption enforcement measures.45 
To provide a gist of the case, consequent to an arrest on March 25, 1991, several raids 
were made on various premises of one S. K. Jain and his family. Large amounts of 
Indian and foreign currency, some notebooks, and a diary were seized in the process.  
The latter contained the initials of several high-ranking politicians, including the then 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, to whom vast amounts were said to have been illegally 
paid. But nothing was done to further investigate the matter which led to a PIL suit filed 
on October 10, 1993, before the Supreme Court of India.    
The petition was to "command performance of the duty under law to properly 
investigate into the accusation of commission of crime and to file a charge-sheet in the 
competent court, if a prima facie case is made out." The primary issue here was 
"(w)hether it is within the domain of judicial review and it could be an effective 
instrument for activating the investigative process which is under the control of the 
executive?" On December 8, 1997, the Court answered in the affirmative by invoking 
Articles 32 (right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of Fundamental 
Rights) and 142 ( right of the Supreme Court to issue orders enforceable throughout the 
country for “doing complete justice”) as provided in the Constitution, and in defense of 
Rule of Law. It also observed: "Inertia was the common rule whenever the alleged 
offender was a powerful person." Having found that the CBI and other investigative 
agencies had not performed their primary duties, the Court directed them to do just that 
by stating that "none stands above the law so that an alleged offence by him is not 
required to be investigated." It is important to note that the Court here was not 
attempting to deal with the merits of the case as such. Its interest was limited only to see 
that investigations are conducted, and the process of justice moved on, without undue 
delay and political interference. 
There were two other issues that came to the fore. One, under what came to be known 
as the “Single Directive,” the Government of India previously laid down that to 
investigate a higher public servant (at the policy making level), prior permission shall 
be obtained from the head of the office concerned. The Court thought such a 
requirement was inhibiting the investigatory process, and quashed it. 
The second, and more importantly, to whom should the investigating agencies be 
accountable? In a parliamentary democracy the Cabinet Minister who is heading the 
Ministry/Department (working under the principles of collective responsibility and 
accountability to Parliament) must be the final referral point. But experience has been 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 10  ·  Issue 1  ·  2009  ·  © International Public Management Network 
49 
 
such that several Ministers either soft-pedaled cases when they or their own ilk are 
involved, and worse, even tried to hush it up for either personal or partisan benefit. The 
Court did not hide its annoyance in this context, and consequently assumed for itself the 
supervisory responsibility by admonishing thus: "...(t)he CBI would not take any 
instructions from, report to, or furnish any particulars thereof to any authority 
personally interested in or likely to be affected by the outcome of the investigations into 
any accusation. This direction applies to any authority which exercises administrative 
control over the CBI by virtue of the office he holds, without any exception." The CBI 
thus was instead asked to report to the Court from time to time as to the progress of the 
investigation till the charge-sheets are filed in appropriate courts.  
The Court did not stop there. It further observed: "The constitution and working of the 
investigating agencies revealed  the lacuna of its (sic) inability to perform whenever 
powerful persons were involved. For this reason, a close examination of the constitution 
of these agencies and their control assumes significance. No doubt, the overall control 
of the agencies and responsibility of their functioning has to be in the executive, but 
then a scheme giving the needed insulation from extraneous influences even of the 
controlling executive is imperative."   
As these proceedings were going on in the Court, the Government of India on July 1, 
1993, constituted a Committee headed by the Home Secretary N. N. Vohra, who 
reported in a scathing tone how dismal the efforts to curb corruption were, and 
recommended the establishment of a nodal agency within the Home Ministry to compile 
all the information coming out of the various investigative agencies. The need for 
improving the procedures for the constitution, and monitoring the functioning, of the 
intelligence agencies was also recognized by this report. 
Yet another Committee was later established (which included Vohra) headed by the 
Cabinet Secretary, which came to be known as the Independent Review Committee 
(IRC). Noting that the investigating agencies are subject to extraneous pressures leading 
to dilatory tactics, they made several recommendations such as the appointment of 
Special Courts to deal exclusively with foreign exchange rules violations, empowering 
the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to appoint special counsel for conducting trials, 
establish within the Ministry of Health medical boards to examine those accused who 
claim medical disability or emergency to stall the proceedings, and so on. Also 
recommended was that members of CVC be selected by a Committee, and the 
appointment be made by the President of India conferring statutory status on the 
Commission.  
The selection of the CBI Director itself tended to be controversial in that the 
government of the day could pick its own minion to subvert any investigation, or 
transfer the incumbent to suit the needs of the day. Moreover, the CBI initially was 
located in the Prime Minister’s office. Taking cognizance of this, the Supreme Court 
placed the CBI under the direction of CVC, and the CBI Director would henceforward 
be appointed by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) on the 
recommendation of a Committee consisting of the CVC Chair, Home Secretary and the 
Secretary of Personnel. Noteworthy is the fact that the latter two are civil servants who 
are beholden to the government of the day.  
The appointment of the Chair of the CVC as well became a bone of contention. This 
appointment is crucial because (s)he would in turn help identify candidates to head the 
CBI (and other investigative agencies such as the and Enforcement Director dealing 
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with foreign exchange crimes). Pursuant to the Supreme Court directive, the BJP 
government passed an Ordinance by September 1998. But the Ordinance was not 
necessarily in compliance with the Supreme Court directive. For example: “The 
Supreme Court did not envisage a multi-member CVC; the ordinance does. The court 
did not specify that Vigilance Commissioner will be selected only from among civil 
servants; the ordinance does so. The Supreme Court did not include the Personnel 
Secretary as ex-officio member; the ordinance does. Having the Personnel Secretary as 
ex-officio member leaves the door open for influence-peddling by bureaucrats who may 
come under the scrutiny of the investigative agencies, since the former will have a 
major say in their posting to the top slots in government.”46 Moreover, the Single 
Directive which the Supreme Court thought was inhibiting the prosecution of higher 
administrators on corruption charges (and hence was quashed), was brought back in the 
Ordinance when it required the permission of CVC to prosecute any officials of Joint 
Secretary and above level and other officials of government Corporations and 
Companies appointed by the government.  
The Ordinance, while providing statutory status on the CVC, prescribed that there 
would be a Central Vigilance Commissioner with a four year tenure, and three other 
Commissioners with 3 year terms each. They cannot be removed from office, but can be 
impeached. The appointments will be made by the President following the 
recommendation of a Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister for Home 
Affairs, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. While the Supreme Court 
directive stipulated that the CVC should be “from a panel of outstanding civil servants 
and others with impeccable integrity” (emphasis added), the Ordinance confined the 
appointment to a higher civil servant.  
As an Ordinance would be in operation for only six months, and the government failed 
to follow it up with a law, all this lapsed on April 4, 1999. Finally the CVC Act was 
passed in 2003 retaining most of the provisions of the previous Ordinance except now it 
would consist of three members, one of whom will be the Chair– all holding a four year 
term. The opinions of CVC will be advisory, and it would pursue only those cases 
referred to it by the government. It would also supervise vigilance officers in all central 
Ministries and Departments. The CBI continues with its police powers of investigation, 
but suffers from several infirmities in its efforts at combating corruption. The first 
pertains to the very appointment of the Director who is picked out of nominees 
suggested by a three member Committee where the majority is held by civil servants, as 
seen above. This led to a rhetorical question by a Joint Director (of the Anti-Corruption 
Head-quarter Zone) who said: “Can two slaves guarantee freedom to a third slave?”47 
The CBI is also short on its staff with just over one thousand investigating officers 
(IOs). On top of all this, one need to think of the time it takes to clear corruption cases, 
assuming that proper clearance is given by the appointing authority. ARC-2 showed that 
the average time taken by trial courts under the Prevention of Corruption Act is 
enormous. In 1996 there were 8,225 cases pending, but in 2005 the number grew to 
12,703. And thus, it recommended that there must be some time limits to dispose off 
these cases.48 
In tune with this dismal state of affairs, it is no surprise that not a single politician 
involved in the (in)famous "hawala" case was convicted. While the CBI claims to have 
a 72.1 percent conviction rate,49 it is noteworthy that no big fish is ever caught or 
convicted which led to the caustic comment by a B. R. Lall, once an insider who 
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thought that its dealings were not equitable. He observed: “It was dealing differently 
with people in power, people not in power and people out of power or favour. The CBI 
was functioning like any other department of government, carrying out executive 
commands rather than working impartially and fearlessly upholding the Law of the 
Land.”50 
Another shortcoming is to be noted here in that the Prevention of Corruption Act does 
not apply to the private sector. The only recourse to bring them to book is by invoking 
the ‘abetment’ provision, mentioned above.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The crucial question then is why corruption in India abounds despite numerous 
institutional arrangements and a plethora of legislation. Could it be due to the 
impossible human nature, as Kautilya observed above? It is theorized  by several that 
corruption is endemic in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) for various reasons: unequal 
access to, and disproportionate distribution of, wealth among the rich and the poor; 
public employment as the only, or primary, source of income; fast changing norms and 
the inability to correspond personal life patterns with public obligations and 
expectations; access to power points accorded by state controls on many aspects of 
private lives; poor, or absent, mechanisms to enforce anti-corruption laws; general 
degradation of morality, or amoral life styles; lack of community sense, and so on.51 The 
Indian case fits into this analysis. But it has more lessons, and yields several other clues.  
First, the emphasis so far has been mostly not so much on correcting the reasons for 
corruption as is the effort to deal with the practices and outcomes of corruption. There 
are only two basic reasons for corruption: need and greed. The prevalence of 
administrative corruption could perhaps be ameliorated to an extent by better pays for 
civil servants. Indeed, in March 2008, the Sixth Pay Commission recommended hefty 
pay raises all over, and one might hope that this could alleviate need, at least at the 
bottom end. But then there is ample evidence that even in the higher paying nations 
corruption is prevalent leading one to conclude that it is simply a matter of size, not that 
of kind which is translated as greed. But greed is a part of prevailing cultural norms, and 
it  becomes a habit when no stigma is attached. The capacity for tolerance attributed to 
Indians as part of their culture has profound impact here. Except for rhetoric and the 
occasional nodding of heads, no outrage is seen, much less serious implementation of 
anti-corruption measures. The Santhanam Committee aptly observed thus: "In the long 
run, the fight against corruption will succeed only to the extent to which a favourable 
social climate is created."52 
Second, the duality in Hindu life leads the same person proclaim a “holier than thou” 
attitude but often indulge in the most debased life. And the liberal, almost amoral, 
attitude that appears to have taken hold since economic liberalization in 1990 only 
encourages this life style further. While deriding the all-pervasive corruption 
intellectually and certainly rhetorically, people are all out on an acquisition binge. Thus 
nothing positive and constructive emerges to stem the general rot.  
Third, the very laws, rules and regulations to curb corruption are themselves corrupted 
insofar as they are not often followed strictly in their spirit, or in fact followed only in 
the letter on occasion. If at all, they are applied selectively and in some places as a 
matter of show, and in other cases as a means of vendetta.  H. L. Mansukhani correctly 
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concluded that the Prevention of Corruption Act turned out to be a "puerile piece of 
legislation."53 
Fourth, paradoxically, sometimes the very Rule of Law and the various rights 
guaranteed to the civil servants in the name of assuring their neutrality and accord 
protection from harassment have been found to come in the way of  bringing the errant 
to book. As noted, Article 311 of the Constitution of India (requiring permission of the 
appointing authority to prosecute) proved to be a major hurdle. 
Fifth, there is not only the absence of sound role models, but also an apparent lack of 
political will to reform. Further, the current trend of coalition governments abet a great 
deal of corruption. Pressured as they are to survive in office, unscrupulous leaders resort 
to all sorts of illegal, amoral, and even unconstitutional means. In an effort just to 
remain in office, coalition governments have been succumbing to the pressures of their 
partners who have learnt that they can get a lot of political mileage by simple threats of 
withdrawal of their support, and by using, or attempting to use, legal and Constitutional 
provisions as partisan tools. In a way, the coalition governments are turning out to be 
hostages of pure partisan and personal interests. The all-consuming effort of these 
governments appears to be no more than keeping in office. It is worth mentioning what 
the ARC-2 said: “It is generally believed that all these...types of wilful abuse of office 
are on the increase in our country at all levels and need to be firmly curbed if we were 
to protect public interest and our democratic system. Otherwise, public servants– 
elected or appointed– will be seen not as custodians of public interest and sentinels of 
democracy but as opportunists working for personal aggrandizement and pursuing 
private agenda while occupying public office.”54     
Sixth, the same recommendations to curb corruption are made ad infinitum but no 
concrete steps are taken. For example, appointment of a Lokayukta (Ombudsman) was 
recommended by the first Administrative Reforms Commission in 1969 and is repeated 
nearly forty years later by ARC-2 in 200755 as nothing happened since the first 
recommendation. Only a shallow debate goes on whether the office of the Prime 
Minister be subjected to the authority of such an Ombudsman. 
Seventh, even when the corrupt are brought to book, there is the lack of expeditious 
disposal of cases due to the slow investigative mechanism and a slower judicial process. 
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, admitting that corruption is a challenge for his 
government, recognized the need for more special courts.56 
In the absence of effective institutions and the poor application of laws, perhaps the 
most crucial element in combating corruption is the social attitude towards corruption. 
As already noted, honesty cannot be legislated. No amount of legal restrictions would 
help so long as the society itself is lenient and tolerant. It is thus hard to decide which is 
the cause and which is the effect: Is the society permissive, or is a corrupt regime 
corrupting the society? The traditional Sanskritic usage, yatha raja, tatha praja (as is 
the king, so is the populace) is often cited to blame the regime. Contrarily, there is the 
cynical theory that a people get a government that they deserve. Indeed, the top public 
leaders have to set an example with the political parties taking the lead, and the nation 
as a collective entity ought to show its intolerance, and give the corrupt the boot. A 
clear and clean sweep of the polity, it appears, thus is the task at hand. One cannot but 
wonder how much more developed India could have been, if only the rot is stemmed.  
Among the aggravating factors, the British colonial legacy is recognized as one by 
ARC-2. While this may be true, sadly three generations have passed since independence 
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with nothing much of a dent in corruption. If only, it is more rampant now. With 
measures such as the inauguration of decentralization of power scheme (under the 73rd 
and 74th Amendments to the Constitution) meant to empower the large masses, and the 
Freedom of Information Act which came into force in 2006 probably leading to 
transparency, strengthened by the several active media outlets and civic groups one 
might be tempted to be optimistic as to the future. It may not have been a lost cause 
altogether. To conclude in the words of ARC-2:  
 
“Indians have always valued a world beyond the material and have 
embraced spiritualism as a way of life. Instances abound in our 
epics of good behaviour, of the triumph of good over evil, of the 
wisdom of sages. Stories of the honesty, generosity and piety of 
legendry kings such as Vikramaditya, are told to our children even 
today. There is no reason why Ram Rajya cannot be attempted. 
 
In modern India, poverty, insufficiency and class conflicts are slowly 
giving way to a confident, inclusive, empowered India. On the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Index, India’s position has 
improved significantly, and hopefully will continue to do so. The 
vigilance of our enlightened people will ensure this.”57 
 
One can only hope that they are correct, and their optimism is not altogether misplaced. 
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